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Abstract 
We analyze, in this paper, the optimality of pro-cyclical monetary policy in the presence of 
informal sector. Our findings suggest that monetary tightening only in case of severe shock with 
high leverage ratio and that conventional monetary policy favors both the formal and informal 
sectors irrespective of the severity of the shocks and hence the whole economy if the size of 
informal sector is significantly large. Furthermore, fixing exchange rate is better policy option if 
objective is to defend the employment or domestic consumption from falling when negative 
shock hits the economy. We can not found any disproportionate impact of policies on informal 
sector. This may be due to static nature of the model and it might be possible that dynamics of 
responses of the two sectors to shocks differ significantly. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In contrast to developed economies, the monetary policy adjustments in emerging 
economies have been empirically pro-cyclical in nature (see for example Edwards (2001) and 
Choudhary et al. (2010)). The main reason for such trend is believed to be the trade-off 
between external and internal forces working simultaneously and mostly in conflicting 
directions. For example, emerging economies face external financial constraints (Goldstein, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Eichengreen and Haussmann (2003)) as a result of which they 
have to keep a balance between exchange rate variability and domestic stability (Devereux and 
Poon 2004). This is why Goldstein et al. (2000) has considered financial vulnerability a binding 
constraint on macroeconomic policy in emerging markets. In such economies, with liabilities in 
foreign currency, firms suffer from exchange rate depreciations (Merola (2010)) and 
consequently face constraints on investments which then reduce their production. Therefore, it 
is optimal for monetary authorities in emerging economies to respond pro-cyclically or, at least, 
less aggressively in case of negative shocks.  
Devereux and Poon (2004) shows that it is optimal for authorities to respond in 
conventional way when shocks are small since the exchange rate acts as a shock absorber. But 
in case of large negative shocks pro-cyclical policy response would be a better option since 
exchange rate adjustment may be de-stabilizing by further strengthening the binding 
constraints. In the similar spirit Choudhary et al. (2010) shows that optimal monetary policy rule 
calls for even more aggressive monetary contractions in economies with poor governance and 
weak institutions. Cook (2002), Choi and Cook (2002), Christiano et al. (2002), and Braggion et 
al. (2003) are other relevant examples. 
In this paper we extend the Devereux and Poon (2004) model by incorporating the informal 
sector of the economy into it and then analyze the optimality of monetary response in case of a 
negative export demand shock. This is an important extension because a significant part of 
aggregate production (usually between 40 percent to 60 percent) consists of informal 
production and it would be interesting to see the response of this sector after being hit by an 
external shock when it is believed to behave differently as compared to the formal sector. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the responses of both the sector are static due of the 
nature of the model borrowed from Deveraux and Poon (2004) and dynamic analysis over a 
period of time would only be possible by involving time domain into the model. Such extension 
has been left for the future. 
The existence of informal sector has been controversial for economic growth since it can 
play a shock absorbing role during economic downturn while it can still be an obstacle in 
economic growth due to low productivity. Also no consensus among the economists exists 
about the impact of policies on informal sector. One belief is that expansionary monetary policy 
imposes inflation tax on informal sector and has negative impacts on this sector. The other 
conviction is that loose monetary policy favors this sector because transactions in this sector 
are mostly cash-based. However, in the case of Pakistan empirical evidence supports the shock 
absorbing nature of the informal sector due to strong correlation of its productivity, which is 
labor intensive to a significant extent, with money supply.  
In our model we incorporate (a) informal labor and (b) informal intermediate goods market. 
Our findings suggest monetary tightening only in case of severe shock with high leverage ratio 
defined as “liabilities to net assets ratio”; and that the conventional monetary policy favors the 
informal sector irrespective of the nature of shock and hence the whole economy if the size of 
informal sector is significantly large. 
2. The Model 
We consider a static small open economy consisting of households who consume foreign and 
domestically produced goods, hold money balances and supply differentiated labor at a 
pre-determined wages.  Firms sell, both at home and abroad, a final good that is produced by 
combining locally produced intermediate inputs and an imported input. The local inputs are 
supplied by firms in both the formal and informal sectors where pure technology considerations 
separate one type of firm from the other.  The foreign input is financed with a local currency 
letter-of-credit type agreement with firms’ net worth serving as the collateral. The 
letter-of-credit is settled by selling the end-of-period output. A sufficiently low value of the 
collateral, against which a letter-of-credit is raised, due to sharp exchange rate movements for 
instance may trigger some rationing of the imported inputs and some substitution towards 
locally produced inputs acquired both from the formal and informal sectors. 
 
 
 
2.1 Firms 
 
2.1.1 The Final Good 
 
A final good Z  is produced in a perfectly-competitive setting using a foreign and a 
composite domestic inputs, my  and dy  respectively, given by a simple Cobb-Douglas 
technology  
 .= 1  dm yyZ
  (1) 
The domestic input dy  is a CES type production function composed of aggregate intermediate 
outputs of firms in the formal )(F  and informal )(I  sectors  
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where F  and I  sum to unity. They denote the share of formal and informal 
‘aggregate’ inputs in total ‘domestic’ inputs respectively while   is their elasticity of 
substitution.  The aggregate input used in each sector i  is given by 
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where   is the elasticity of substitution, which is assumed similar across the sectors. 
Let nip ,  be the price of input ‘ n ’ in the ith  sector.  Minimizing the cost 
1
0
 dnyp nini ,,  
gives the following demand in sector i  for each intermediate good n  
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The producer of the final good can purchase the foreign and the domestically produced 
formal inputs on credit against its net worth so that 
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In (5) the first term, on the left-hand-side, is the value of imported intermediate input at 
foreign prices, mp , evaluated at the exchange rate ( S ) while the second term is the value of 
domestic inputs produced in the formal economy.  The right-hand-side of (5) is the firm’s net 
worth composed of assets ( N ), foreign liabilities evaluated at current exchange rate ( SD ) and 
domestic liabilities ( D ).  This is a collateral constraint and it limits the ability of the firm to 
finance the purchase of imported intermediate inputs and/or formal-sector inputs when there 
is a negative shock to the net worth. In this paper we exclusively focus on the impact of adverse 
exchange rate shocks on the firms’ net worth. Exchange rate may effects the net worth of the 
firm in two ways. On one hand, it raises the value of imported inputs and on the other hand it 
reduces the net worth of the firm by increasing its foreign liabilities. 
 Firm’s optimization problem gives following derived demand functions for different inputs.  
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Combining (6) and (7) we get  
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Combining (6), (7) and (9) we get the price of the final good in terms of all the inputs. 
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The above pricing equation suggests a full pass-through. 
Substituting the value of Fty  from (8) in terms of the foreign input ( mty ) the financial 
constraints (5) becomes 
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2.1.2 The Intermediate Inputs Sector 
 
The production of intermediate inputs is divided into formal ( F ) and the informal ( I ) 
sectors.  Both sectors are populated by a representative firm that produces output using labor 
as the only factor of production.  The intermediate goods produced in each sector are 
imperfect substitutes.  Hence, the production function of the representative firm in each 
sector is given by 
 
 nFnF AHy ,, =  (12) 
 
and 
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The aggregate output in each sector is 
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Firm n in each sector i minimizes the cost inin yp
1
0
 subject to constraint given in Eq. 
(14). This gives following relationship. 
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This computation assumes that each firm has the market power over its products due to 
imperfect substitutability between inputs. 
The amounts of various types of labor employed by firm n  in sector i  is 
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The labor for type r  employed in sector i  by n  firms is 
  dnnHH riir )(= ,
1
0  (17) 
 
Total labor employment of all types of labor r  in sector i  is 
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In sector ,i  the firm n  chooses employment so as to minimize costs drHW nrinri ,,,,
1
0 , 
subject to the constraint (18).  The demand for type r  labor due to this minimization is 
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Also, firm n  maximizes profits niinini HWyP ,,,   so that 
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2.2 The Household 
 
A representative household h  maximizes an additively separable utility function 
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 , 0>  are constants, 0>  is the elasticity of substitution and PhM )/(  denotes real 
money holdings.  It consumes foreign fC  and domestically dC  produced goods so that 
)()(=)( 1 hChChC fd
   where   is the share of domestic consumption. Its budget constraint is 
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where ,P  ),(0 hM  )(hT  )(h  denote the general price level, initial money holding, 
money transfers from the monetary authority and profits from selling the final good 
respectively. 
  
Demand for each of the foreign and domestic produced good can be obtained as.  
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and that of money balances as: 
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 where as )(1)
1
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md SPPP  is the aggregate price and dP  and mP  denote the 
price of domestic and foreign consumer goods. We assume that no adjustment in wages take at 
the time when the shocks hit the economy. Each household faces a downward-sloping labor 
demand curve. The expected utility maximizing wage is given by
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Here subscript i denotes the sector. And aggregate wage is given by 
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The households have market power over the type of labor it supplies to formal sector.  
Using this market power, they maximize the difference between their expected-utility 
maximizing wage and the average prevailing wage in the sector so that they maximize
)()()( rHWrHrW FFFF  . We assume no such differentiation in informal labor. Therefore 
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So utility maximizing wage for formal and informal sector can be written as 
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The first-order conditions (23) and (24) are the demand for domestic and foreign goods 
and are negatively sloped in their respective prices.  The first-order condition (25) reflects the 
value of consumption in term of money and (26) gives the inverse supply of labor. It says that 
the expected marginal rates of substitution between labor and consumption are equal to the 
wage rate. In addition, equation (29) for formal sector also reflects the market power of 
households arising from their monopolistic supply of a differentiated factor input in this sector 
with elasticity . We assume that wages are bargained at the beginning of the period, i.e., 
intuitively they are conditioned upon the expected money supply.  
 
 
2.3 Market Clearing Conditions 
 
Assume that foreign demand for locally produced final good is unit elastic  
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where X  is a demand shock. 
The following conditions hold 
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Equations (32) and (33) show market-clearing condition for the money and product 
markets respectively. 
 
2.4 Equilibrium Conditions without collateral constraint  
 
In normal times collateral constraint does not bind, so equilibrium conditions can be 
characterized using money market clearing condition along with profit maximization  
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and 
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Therefore equilibrium condition can be written as 
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 And optimal price is given by 
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Equations (6), (7), (11), (12), (35), (36), and (37) can be solved for hP , S , Z , Fy , Iy , FH , 
and IH  given export demand X and wage rate W.   
 
2.5 Equilibrium Conditions with collateral constraint for the Domestic Market 
 
When the collateral constraint binds, the maximum foreign input for the production of 
the final good that could be purchased is given by  
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This value must then be used in all the equilibrium conditions without any constraint so 
that the total expenditure on domestically produced goods is 
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The demand for nominal money balances now becomes 
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The total output produced by the economy in the constrained region is 
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The demand for the domestic input given using the constraint is given by 
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This constrained demand can then be substituted in (9) to obtain factor demands for 
formal and informal inputs so that: 
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At equilibrium, demand for all types of domestic inputs must equate to their supply.  
Hence, by substituting (35) and (36) in (14) and (15) we find that 
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In order to obtain the exchange rate we use (6) and (27) to obtain  
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Rearranging the above gives the exchange rate at which the collateral constraint is 
satisfied below 
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3 Discussion  
We analyze a situation where there is a negative demand shock so that X  falls in (23).  If the 
country wants to maintain its output, the currency must correspondingly depreciate, i.e. S  
should go up.  But a rise in S (a depreciation) has other effects. As exchange rate depreciates 
substantially, the trade-credit constraint binds in (33).  This implies an overall reduction in the 
production of the final good (the income effect).  At the same time, domestic inputs become 
relatively cheap and the producer reallocates some of her demand from foreign inputs to 
domestic inputs.  This reallocated demand then redistributes between the formal and 
informal sector. This distribution depends on many factors such as productivity, relative prices 
and labor market power between the formal and informal sectors and the size of the sectors.  
The reaction of the monetary policy to such a shock will then depend on the size of these 
various effects.  Furthermore, a rise in S also raises the price of the final good.  The latter is 
because the foreign intermediate input is priced in the foreign currency. 
4 Calibration 
We assume that demand for exports (X) is exogenous. Further we assume three scenarios to be 
tested in case of both the fixed exchange rate and fixed money supply policy separately, 
however, the leverage only matters in case of the fixed money supply policy. Our aim is to see 
which of the two policies, either holding money supply constant or exchange rate constant, is 
more effective when the static economy is hit by an exogenous export demand shock. The 
three scenarios are the following: 
i. In the first case there is no shock to exports with a probability 0.475; 
ii. in the second case there is a moderate shock that decreases output by 5 percent 
with probability 0.475; 
iii. and in the third case a severe shock that decreases output by 11 percent with small 
probability 0.05. It is only in this case that the external constraints become a binding. 
 The main issue in calibration of such model for emerging economies is that information 
regarding deep parameters is limited or unavailable, especially for the parameters related to 
the informal sector. There are 15 parameters to be calibrated (see table 1) in our model. Most 
of the values chosen for these parameters are consistent with features of developing countries 
like Pakistan. The Share of domestic inputs in production ( ) is assumed to be 0.75. This is 
consistent with the estimate for intermediate imports as a fraction of GDP for Pakistan. The 
preference parameter on money (  ) is set equal to unity. Elasticity of substitution between 
formal and informal inputs ( ) is set equal to 1.9 by assuming low substitution between two 
types because of their different nature. The parameter on technological differential ( ) is 
assumed to be 0.7 since no information regarding this parameter is available. Similarly, the 
elasticity of substitution between different types of labor ( ) is assumed to be 5. The elasticity 
of substitution between intermediate inputs in each sector ( ) is set equal to 6. This value is 
taken from literature for formal inputs. The value for parameter representing weight on leisure 
( ) is taken as 0.6, based on evidence that households allocate 33 percent of their time for 
work. Share of informal sector production ( I ) is set equal to 0.4 on the basis of estimates on 
informal sector in such countries. The share of labor in formal sector ( F ) is set equal to 0.65. 
This estimate is taken from Labor Force Survey (LFS) of Pakistan. Information regarding the 
elasticity of substitution between formal and informal labor ( ) are not available, so we 
assume a value of 2 for this parameter. Based on some evidence that 35% of consumption in 
developing countries consists of foreign goods we set share of domestic consumption in total 
consumption ( ) equals to 0.65. We use different leverage ratios (defined as the ratio of 
foreign liabilities to net total assets) between 0.25 (most probably non-binding financial 
constraint) and 1.00 (highly binding financial constraint). Finally the value on the inverse 
elasticity of labor supply ( ) is set equal to 0.9. 
 
Table 1: Calibration of Model Parameters 
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4.1 Stylized Facts  
Though we cannot find correlation between formal and informal sector production and 
consumption due to unavailability of information on these variables, but we can check the 
correlations between the growth of currency in circulation and growth in employment and 
wages in both of sectors. We used LFS’s data from 1991 to 2007 to calculate correlations of 
(formal and informal) wage growth with currency growth and correlation of (formal and 
informal) employment growth with currency growth respectively. We can see from table 2 that 
these correlations are stronger in case of informal sector as compared to the formal sector. This 
shows that any reduction in money supply hurts informal sector more than formal sector. 
Furthermore, the correlation between growth of informal employment and money growth is 
even stronger then the correlation between growth of formal employment and money growth. 
This means that in case of any changes in money supply, the change in wages in the informal 
sector is relatively small and hence a large adjustment takes place in employment due to lower 
labor cost in this sector.   
  
Table 2 
Correlations of currency growth with growth of labor and wages 
Informal wage Formal wage Informal 
Employment  
Formal Employment 
0.25 0.09 0.41 0.10 
 
4.2 Simulations Results  
The static model is simulated for the three scenarios outlined above and the results are 
organized in the tables below. In table 3, expected loss in output, employment and 
consumption are presented against each of the two policy option. These results show that 
fixing exchange rate is the better policy option only in case of severe export demand shock with 
indebtness higher than 50% of the net assets of the firm. Fixed exchange rate is also better 
policy option if the objective is to prevent losses in employment due to the negative shock to 
export demand. Furthermore, loss in employment decreases with increase in leverage ratio i.e. 
indebtness of the firm. This is because of substitution of labor for imported inputs as firm 
become more financially constrained.  
The fixed exchange rate is also better option if policy is consumption oriented. An appreciated 
exchange rate results into reduction in exports and favors domestic consumption. Or in other 
words, the loss in exports is disproportionally higher as compared to domestic consumption if 
the exchange rate does not depreciate in response to a negative shock. The loss in consumption 
also varies inversely with leverage ratio.             
Table 3 
 
Policy 
Option 
 
Leverage 
Ratio 
 
Expected Loss 
 
yf yi Z Hf Hi C 
Fixed 
Exchange 
Rate 
 
- 
0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 
 
Fixed 
Money 
0.25 0.017 0.017 0.048 0.074 0.074 0.102 
0.5 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.073 0.073 0.098  
1 0.088 0.088 0.052 0.072 0.072 0.092 
 
In table 4, expected utility of household is shown for different policy options and for shocks of 
different magnitudes. Results show that expected utility of households is higher in case of fixed 
money supply irrespective of the leverage ratio and extent of shock though it falls as shock 
becomes more and more severe. Level of indebtness has no impact on expected utility if shock 
is small but it varies inversely with leverage ratio in case the shock is of significant magnitude.  
Table 4 
 
Policy Option 
Leverage Ratio Expected  Utility of Household 
X1 X2 X3 
Fixed Exchange 
Rate - 0.261 0.244 0.192 
 
Fixed Money 
0.25 0.364 0.338 0.248 
0.5 0.364 0.338 0.261 
1 0.364 0.338 0.279 
 
These results confirm the hypotheses that in case of a small shock exchange rate adjustments 
have stabilizing role but when the shock is large, the exchange rate depreciation will 
deteriorate the situation even further. However, our model fails to show any disproportionate 
impact of policies on formal and informal sector. This may be due to the static nature of the 
model and it might be possible that dynamics of responses of the sectors to shocks differ 
significantly.  
 
5Conclusion 
 
The static study shows that fixing exchange rate is a better policy option only in case of:  
i. severe export demand shock with high indebtness; 
ii. or if the objective is to defend the employment or domestic consumption from 
falling when negative export demand shock hits the economy. 
We can not found any disproportionate impact of policies on informal sector. This may be 
due to static nature of the model and it might be possible that dynamics of responses of the 
two sectors to shocks differ significantly.  
Though this study is helpful in analyzing the different policy options available to policy makers, 
there are some caveats which, although out of scope of this paper, require further research. 
Firstly, the model is static and is not capable of analyzing the dynamic impacts of different 
policy options. Secondly, the external sector is not properly modeled, and thirdly, the model is 
silent about the optimal policy response in case of domestic demand shock. However, despite 
these shortcomings, the study may be helpful in designing better policies to stabilize the 
economy by keeping balance internal and external forces. 
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